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SCENE SETTING 
There are often difficulties in accommodating the interests of minority nationalities 
within nation-states. The proliferation of states created by decolonization has 
magnified such problems. Colonial borders often included groups with emerging 
identities, and the problems of fostering national cohesion within borders 
encompassing such diversity has sometimes been especially intense. 
Various forms of federalist and similar arrangements for the territorial distribution 
of power have been employed in efforts to accommodate the concerns of ethnic and 
other identity groups (Watts, 1999; Ghai, 2000; 2002a). Implementation and 
operation of such arrangements can be far from easy in postcolonial states, where 
capacity and resources are often limited. Pressures for asymmetrical arrangements for 
nationalist minorities can magnify such problems, as they tend to be seen as "an 
incentive for spiralling devolution, fuelling secession, catalysing the eventual 
implosion of the state" (Baldacchino, 2006). 
Island sub-national jurisdictions offer an instructive distinct category for examining 
the ways in which tensions between nation-states and sub-national units are managed 
(Baldacchino, 2006). Indeed, as Baldacchino points out, islands represent "quintes-
sential platforms for nation states ... [as] finite island geography smoothens the 
nurturing of a sense of identity that is contiguous with territory" (Baldacchino, 2006), 
a perception that would raise expectations of pressure for nation-state status on the 
part of non-sovereign island territories. 
In fact, over the past 20 years that has not been happening - most sub-national 
island autonomies have not been seeking nation-state status. McElroy and Mahoney 
(1999) suggest that in large part this is because there are substantial economic 
advantages to small non-sovereign island units remaining part of a larger state. Many 
island autonomies have developed innovative economic policy and governance 
practices that enable them to escape the economic vulnerability that would tend to go 
together with either full sovereignty or the absence of autonomy (Baldacchino, 2004). 
The economic practices involve powers over key aspects of finance; natural resources; 
access (through transport); free movement of persons; and tourism policy. The 
creative political practices involve high levels of jurisdictional prerogative; articula-
tion of national identity; defence and promotion of minority rights; and para-
diplomacy. Through use of such devices, asserts Baldacchino, island autonomies can 
develop high standards of living and levels of self-rule, the outcome being that "there 
hardly appears to be any sentiment for independence among non-sovereign island 
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territories today ... [and while] there are a number of peoples waitmg in the 
proverbial wings to declare their statehood ... only one of these is an island" 
(Baldacchino, 2004, p. 78) 
That exception is Bougainville, a reluctant part of the southwest Pacific state of 
Papua New Guinea (PNG). If other secessionist situations, such as the Indonesian 
examples of Papua and Aceh, and the Philippines case of Mindanao, are also classified 
as non-sovereign island territories, then the detail of Baldacchino's classification can 
be contested, but not his basic point about the tendency of many such territories to 
explore innovative alternatives to secession. The question then arises as to why 
Bougainville and other island secessionist cases are not also exploring such alternative 
strategies. One factor that may be of significance is that, unlike many of the island 
autonomies considered by Baldacchino, Bougainville and the other divergent cases 
just mentioned do not involve autonomy arising from a colonial relationship (as, for 
example, with the former colonial territories of New Zealand and the USA or the 
continuing Pacific island colonial territories of France). It is in the special 
circumstances of making choices about the management of continuing or modifying 
such relationships that the autonomy arrangements and the innovative strategies have 
developed. 
In the Bougainville case nationalism was first asserted in the years leading to PNG's 
1975 independence from Australia (Griffin, 1972; 1973; Mamak and Bedford, 1974). 
The emergence of several 'micro-nationalist' movements (May, 1982), including one 
in Bougainville, was among the complex factors that had to be taken into account in 
making choices for PNG's independence constitution. PNG had a weak state and 
fragile administration and no national identity to help foster national cohesion. Its 
constitution would have to deal with both state building and nation building. But 
how was this to be done? 
This chapter examines the tensions between various approaches used since PNG's 
independence in efforts to respond to minority nationalist pressures, the initial choice 
being between a unitary state and a devolved state with substantial self-government 
for territorially based communities. The particular focus is Bougainville, the one part 
of PNG where sub-national identity has not been accommodated by devolution. 
Rather, there have been two secession attempts, one in 1975 and the other from 1988 
to 1989 as part of a bitter and bloody civil war. The latter conflict was settled in 2001 
only by PNG agreeing to both asymmetrical autonomy and keeping open the 
possibility of independence through a constitutionally guaranteed but deferred 
referendum on the issue. The autonomy arrangements have been in their early stages 
of implementation since 2006. 
The analysis addresses the vexed question of whether asymmetrical autonomy, in 
particular, inevitably creates pressure for progress towards independence. It also 
considers the extent to which the economic policy and governance practices identified 
by Baldacchino have been available to and used by Bougainville. 
PNG AND BOUGAINVILLE 
Bougainville is an island autonomy within a nation-state comprising half of one of the 
world's largest islands, and thousands of other islands of various sizes. The PNG 
'mainland' consists of the eastern half of New Guinea and, to the east, includes the 
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three large islands of New Britain, New Ireland and Bougainville, each with 
numerous associated small islands. With well over 800 distinct languages, PNG is a 
country of unparalleled linguistic and cultural diversity. Bougainville's roughly 
200000 people (about 4% of PNG's population of more than five million) reflect that 
same diversity, speaking 25 distinct languages and many more sub-languages and 
dialects (Tryon, 2005). 
PNG is a creation of the late colonial era. The UK and Germany took control of the 
southern (Papua) and northern (German New Guinea) parts, respectively, in 1884. 
Australia assumed control of Papua in 1906, and ousted Germany from New Guinea 
at the beginning of World War I, later taking a League of Nations mandate over the 
former German territory, including Bougainville. Papua and New Guinea were 
administered jointly only from 1946 until PNG's independence in September 1975. 
Governing through a highly centralized, bureaucratic system (Tordoff and Watts, 
1974; CPC, 1974; Conyers, 1976), Australia had limited objectives (largely concerned 
with its own security and extraction of some resources). Large parts of the territory 
remained almost untouched by either colonial administration or the market until the 
late colonial period, Christian missions bringing more change to the lives of perhaps 
most communities than either state or market. Pre-colonial social structures persisted, 
most people living in groups of no more than a few hundred. Internal communica-
tions were poor, there was little mobility of people or goods, and little political or 
economic integration. Thus, little sense of a common identity developed among 
PNG's disparate communities. 
Bougainville is a group of islands about 1000 kilometres east of the mainland PNG 
capital of Port Moresby, close to the western islands of the neighbouring country of 
Solomon Islands, with whose inhabitants the islanders share appearance, language 
groups and culture. The two main islands are Bougainville and the much smaller 
Buka, separated by a narrow sea passage. Cultural and linguistic differences and 
uneven development during and after the colonial era have been among factors 
contributing to differing identities and economic interests among Bougainvilleans. In 
particular, many groups in Buka and on the east coast of Bougainville adjacent to the 
colonial administrative centre and plantations have had much greater access than 
others to education, employment and opportunities for economic advancement, a 
source of inequality that contributes to tensions and divisions (Ogan, 1996; Nash, 
2001; Regan, 2005b; Tanis, 2005). On the other hand, a sense of identity separate 
from the rest of PNG emerged during the twentieth century, the primary marker being 
the distinctive very dark skin colour of most Bougainvilleans (Griffin, 1972; 1973; 
Mamak and Bedford, 1974; Nash and Ogan, 1990; Oliver, 1991). 
Identity was politicized by grievances about colonial neglect, compounded by the 
imposition by the Australian colonial administration of the operationalization by 
Bougainville Copper Ltd (BCL) of one of the world's largest copper and gold mines at 
Panguna in central Bougainville (Bedford and Mamak, 1977; Connell, 1991; Oliver, 
1991; Regan, 1998a; 2003; Denoon, 2000). Bougainvilleans perceived the mine as 
being established for the economic benefit of the rest of PNG, with Bougainville 
carrying the social and environmental costs, but receiving little mine revenue. BCL's 
total earnings in its 17 years of operation (April 1972 to May 1989) were US$4.6 
billion, which generated $1.9 billion in revenue, of which just 5.63% went to 
Bougainville: 4.27% (mostly mineral royalties) to Bougainville's provincial govern-
ment (see below) and 1.36% to Bougainvillean owners of land leased for mining 
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purposes (rents, compensation and a small share of royalty payments) (Connell, 1991; 
Quodling, 1991, p. 55; Regan, 2003, p. 139). 
From the late 1960s, with PNG's independence from Australia approaching, there 
was growing talk in Bougainville of possible independence from PNG (Griffin, 1972; 
1973; Ghai and Regan, 2000, pp. 244-247). Educated leaders mainly used talk of 
independence in efforts to mobilize support for more modest goals of autonomy and 
increased mining revenue. Yet, in the process, many Bougainvilleans increasingly saw 
independence as a solution to a wide range of social problems, and as a real 
possibility. 
A UNITARY OR A DEVOLVED STATE? 
In the lead-up to an independence resulting more from Australian responses to 
emerging international pressure than from internal demands, people in some areas of 
PNG sought a significant degree of autonomy from the unknown emerging state 
through local organizations and institutions (Conyers, 1976; Ballard, 1981; May, 
1982). Nowhere was the demand for local autonomy stronger than in Bougainville. 
At the same time there was strong support for the opposing view that PNG's 
diversity would best be kept unified through a continuation of the unitary 
arrangements of the colonial state. This approach was preferred by the departing 
colonial regime and key leaders of PNG's first indigenous government, in power after 
the last election to the colonial legislature (1972), and with self-governing status from 
1973. 
In the independence constitution-making process (1972-75), two contrary 
paradigms emerged, each claiming to be best suited to the needs of building national 
identity and unity.l The main support for the local autonomy approach came from 
the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC), a committee of the colonial legislature 
under the leadership of a young member of the legislature from Bougainville, John 
Momis. The CPC developed proposals for the independence constitution presented in 
a long and detailed report in mid-1974 (CPC, 1974). It saw local autonomy as both 
accommodating ethnic identity (thereby contributing to national unity) and 
improving the efficiency and responsiveness of the hitherto inefficient centralized 
colonial state by encouraging popular participation (Wolfers et at., 1982, p. 286; 
Ghai and Regan, 1992, pp. 8-52; Ballard, 1981). The CPC was in part responding to 
pressure from Bougainville (Griffin et at., 1979; Ballard, 1981; Ghai and Regan, 
1992), where from 1973 the national government reluctantly conceded limited 
autonomy by recognizing a Bougainville Interim Provincial Government. 
No one seriously pushed for federalism, however, largely because there were no 
strong ethnic or territorial groupings - other than Bougainville - demanding 
territorial autonomy. Yet the CPGs conceptualization of devolution entrenched in the 
constitution came close to a form of quasi-federalism.2 
After initial ambivalence the government, under Chief Minister Michael Somare, 
ultimately opposed the CPC proposals (on the grounds of unity, efficiency and 
economic rationality) and in July 1975 persuaded the colonial legislature (sitting as a 
constituent assembly) to reject them (Conyers, 1976; Ballard, 1981; Ghai and Regan, 
1992). This precipitated a major crisis in Bougainville. The choice between a unitary 
or a devolved state thus emerged as the most contentious constitutional issue. 
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DEVOLUTION, 1976-20013 
On the rejection of constitutionally protected devolution Bougainville declared its 
separate independence from PNG on 1 September 1975, days before PNG's 
Independence Day. Failure to secure international recognition and concern about 
dangers of violence encouraged Bougainville leaders to negotiate, with John Momis 
(who resigned from the national legislature in support of Bougainville secession) 
playing a moderating role (Ballard, 1981; Griffin and Togolo, 1997; Momis, 2005, 
pp. 312-314). A central government under its first prime minister, Michael Somare, 
who knew John Momis well, was both conscious of the risk of other areas in the 
fragile new nation following Bougainville's example and concerned about possible 
loss of revenue from the mine. It was thus also under pressure to resolve its differences 
with Bougainville. Six months of negotiations concluded with an August 1976 
agreement on constitutionally entrenched autonomy arrangements for Bougainville. 
A major question, however, was whether autonomy should be asymmetrical - with 
many powers and resources reserved to Bougainville - or symmetrical, with 
arrangements negotiated by Bougainville being extended to PNG's other 18 
provinces. 
Even in the lead-up to independence there had been concern that special 
arrangements for Bougainville would be divisive for PNG, and the concessions 
towards autonomy secured by Bougainville had been generalized to other provinces 
(Conyers, 1976; Ballard, 1981; Ghai and Regan, 1992). However, in 1976 the 
negotiations were truly bilateral, and Bougainville argued for special arrangements. 
PNG's negotiators were initially open to the proposal and as a result conceded 
significantly greater provincial powers than would otherwise have been the case. But, 
as final details were negotiated, fears of special arrangements being divisive again 
dominated, and PNG reserved the right to extend the concessions to all the provinces. 
Bougainville agreed reluctantly, mainly because of awareness that amendments to the 
national constitution would require a high degree of support in parliament, where 
representation was still seen in provincial terms. 
In the end the constitutional amendment provided for an almost completely 
uniform system of devolution. The main exception involved distribution of mining 
royalties that in practice applied only in Bougainville (at least until other major mines 
began to operate elsewhere in PNG from 1984) (Axline, 1986; Ghai and Regan, 
1992, pp. 234-259). This ensured a unique degree of fiscal independence for the 
North Solomons Provincial Government (NSPG) - a name chosen to emphasize 
Bougainville's links to communities in the neighbouring country of Solomon Islands. 
The devolution arrangements were even more quasi-federal than the original CPC 
proposals on which they drew. The legal provisions were contained in the 
constitution, in the form of principles, with an organic law (the Organic Law on 
Provincial Government) setting out details. Organic laws are as difficult to amend or 
repeal as the constitution, and so devolution enjoyed considerable legal protection. 
The Organic Law distributed legislative powers through two lists (Ghai and Regan, 
1992, pp. 33 - 38, 135 -194): a short one of 'primarily' provincial subjects and a long 
one of concurrent powers. In the former, provincial laws prevailed over national laws, 
which could be made only if a province had not made an exhaustive law on a subject 
in this list. For concurrent subjects, national law prevailed over provincial law, but 
national laws could be made only on a matter 'of national interest' and 'to the extent 
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that the matter is of national interest'. Another principle qualified the scope of national 
laws on concurrent subjects. Since, at the start of devolution, there were national laws 
on most such subjects, a provincial government desiring to make a law in a field 
occupied by national law could request repeal of national government law in relation to 
the province to the extent necessary to permit provincial law to be made on matters of 
provincial interest. The presumption was that the national government would oblige, 
unless there was a pressing national interest in having central legislation on the subject. 
Subjects not listed stayed with the national government. Thus the system, while 
maintaining the ultimate authority of one or the other level of government in respect of 
every subject, was intended to provide considerable flexibility. 
Provincial government structures (Ghai and Regan, 1992, pp. 77-134) were 
required to meet basic criteria set out in the Organic Law - notably an elected 
legislature - but some latitude in choice of structures was provided for in provincial 
constitutions made through consultative processes. The effective working of the 
complex provisions for fiscal arrangements (guaranteed grants and some exclusively 
provincial taxes), the allocation of legislative authority and the division of 
administrative powers and staff were all intended to depend on cooperation between 
governments. Such cooperation was to be secured through basic principles and 
procedures (such as the obligation of a government at one level to give notice to 
governmentls at the other level of its legislative proposals, and a general obligation for 
consultation), and through intergovernmental institutions. The Premiers' Council was 
the main institution. Bringing together the prime minister and senior ministers with 
premiers of provinces, its primary function was to discuss fiscal policies and transfers, 
legislative powers of provinces, intergovernmental cooperation and the resolution of 
disputes. To avoid excessive legalism, disputes had to be resolved through 
negotiations or mediation, if possible, before they could be taken to a court. 
This description comes close to a model of cooperative federalism or devolution. 
Within broad principles it provided a framework for continuing negotiations, 
especially on the gradual transfer of powers from the centre under the two legislative 
lists, and on the allocation of resources. It put a premium on trust and good faith; but 
also on capacity to handle complex institutions and negotiations. 
Implementation started well, with considerable support from the national 
government. Popular consultation to prepare provincial constitutions heightened a 
consciousness of a common identity and future. The pace was set by Bougainville, 
whose leaders brought great energy and planning to developing the NSPG. Tensions 
between the national government and provinces keen on autonomy (including 
Bougainville) seemed to be getting resolved. By 1979 all 19 provincial governments 
had been established (Ghai and Regan, 1992, pp. 49-75). Devolution seemed to have 
transformed, constructively, the PNG political scene. State building and nation 
building appeared indeed to go hand in hand. 
But this rosy picture did not last, the most critical reason being that the intended 
fluidity of political power gave way to the reality of consolidation of the central state 
apparatus (Ghai, 1997; Ghai and Regan, 1992; 2001). The dominant position of the 
state in relation to the PNG economy meant that political and bureaucratic access to 
the state was the main means of accumulation of wealth. The central state remained 
the primary site of power, attracting most leading politicians. But at the same time 
national politicians resented the competition for powers and resources from 
provincial leaders. Moreover, few provincial governments operated effectively and 
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they thus failed to mobilize strong popular support (Ghai and Regan, 2000). Nor 
were provincial governments able to cooperate effectively through the intergovern-
mental mechanisms to apply pressure to the national government to transfer 
increasing powers and resources. More importantly, capacity for policy and 
administration was weak at all levels of government (in large part because of the 
failure of the Australian colonial administration to develop an educated elite). 
Provincial governments made little use of the legislative powers available to them. 
Resources of most provincial governments decreased rather than increased. 
By the early 1980s relations between the national government and provincial 
governments were often strained. The national government paid little more than lip 
service to aspects of the machinery that it could not ignore. Arrangements for 
suspension of provincial governments were amended in 1983, removing important 
procedural safeguards against abuse. Those powers were subsequently used 
extensively against provincial governments and often for purely political reasons. 
The NSPG was one of few exceptions to the gloomy picture (Ghai and Regan, 
1992; Griffin and Togolo, 1997), with its strong base in community support 
mobilized by the identity politics of the 1970s and its comparatively strong revenue 
base. In the 1970s the central priorities of Bougainville's elite leadership had been to 
achieve autonomy and a share of mining revenue. The 1976 decentralization 
arrangements and the economic opportunities available to them ensured that 
members of the elite were accommodated. Hence the NSPG could manage relations 
with the national government within the framework of the constitutional arrange-
ments, admittedly with some tensions. For the most part it was fully occupied with 
maintaining basic services, managing its capital expenditure programme and 
gradually building capacity from the very weak local base left by the centralized 
colonial administration. Until the early to mid-1980s it was unable to put much effort 
into developing its own policies (Ghai and Regan, 2000). 
In terms of the kinds of innovative strategies used by island autonomies to bolster 
their positions vis-ii-vis the central government, the creative political capacities 
identified by Baldacchino (2006) were not readily available to Bougainville. It did not 
already have established high levels of jurisdictional prerogative, and was instead 
gradually working to develop these. It was still in the early stages of articulation of 
national identity. The defence and promotion of minority rights was not a strategy 
readily available in PNG, where all language and culture groups are small minorities. 
Para-diplomacy had not been developed. Much the same was true of the five 
economic strategies highlighted by Baldacchino (Baldacchino, 2006), in large part 
because the powers of the NSPG under the constitutional devolution arrangements 
were quite limited. It did not have control of key aspects of finance, such as banking 
and insurance, and had limited tax powers. It had virtually no control over land and 
natural resources policy. It did not control access through power over transport. It 
had almost no control over movement of persons, and so could not control the influx 
of large numbers of persons from elsewhere in PNG, attracted by economic 
opportunities in Bougainville, often squatting on customary land. The many outsiders 
were seen by Bougainvilleans as both undermining their traditional authority and 
culture, and a major contributing factor to growing law and order problems. Mining 
and agriculture being the major economic sectors, tourism was not a major concern in 
Bougainville. Overall, the NSPG had limited power to respond to the ongoing 
tensions associated with the unresolved grievances of ordinary people over the 
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impacts of the mine and the influx of outsiders, something that was a contributing 
factor to the violent conflict that developed in 1988 - 89 (Regan, 1998a, 1998b; 
Premdas, 1998; Ghai and Regan, 2000; Kauona, 2001; Tanis, 2005). 
CONFLICT AND PEACE PROCESS, 1988 - 2001 
Neither the NSPG nor the national government expected that such tensions would 
contribute to a civil war in Bougainville from late 1988.4 The conflict was 
precipitated by inter-generational disputes within communities owning land where 
the mine was located over distribution of mine revenues payable to landowners. 
Frustration on the part of younger landowners with links to disgruntled 
Bougainvillean mine workers led to destruction of mine property. Mainly intended 
to create pressure for increased benefits, this action instead led to generalized violent 
responses by PNG forces. This violence acted as a catalyst for a broader rebellion led 
by a key figure among the younger mine lease landowners, Francis Ona. Had the 
NSPG wielded power over land and mining, and possessed some ability to limit 
squatting on customary land by outsiders, the situation would probably have 
developed quite differently. But, as the rebellion gathered force in 1979, the NSPG, 
led by Joseph Kabui, the young premier from the mine lease area with close 
relationships with many of the leaders of the rebellion, was in a difficult position, 
suspected by both the national government and the rebels. 
Political support for secession was mobilized around both the long-held 
Bougainvillean grievances concerning the mine and Bougainvillean identity. How-
ever, the secessionist leadership, having made a unilateral declaration of indepen-
dence soon after the withdrawal of PNG forces from Bougainville in March 1990, 
largely lost control of the situation soon after that, as internal Bougainville conflict 
undermined what would have otherwise been fairly broad support for secession. It 
was both civil war among Bougainvilleans and the fight between the pro-secessionist 
Bougainvillean faction and the national government that resulted in heavy loss of life 
and property, the breakdown of essential services, economic stagnation, missed 
educational opportunities for a whole generation, and the destruction of most of the 
impressive capacity of the provincial administration developed since the mid-1970s. 
The NSPG was suspended by the national government from mid-1990. 
It would take too long to recite the causes and course of the complex conflict and its 
ending through a remarkable peace process beginning in mid-1997.5 Rather, we have 
to jump to late 1998, when, active fighting having ceased, rival Bougainville factions 
began talks on reconciliation and resolving their differences. One faction was led by 
Joseph Kabui, who in the early 1990s had become the deputy to the rebel leader, 
Francis Ona. It advocated secession. The other faction, a coalition of groups 
supporting stronger autonomy within PNG, was led by John Momis, back in the 
national parliament ever since 1977. There was a third faction under Ona that refused 
to join the peace process, claiming that independence had already been achieved in 
1990, but this group had limited popular support. 
The compromise reached in advance of negotiations with PNG beginning in June 
1999 involved those supporting independence dropping their demands for early 
independence and instead agreeing to deal with that issue through a referendum 
among Bougainvilleans on the question, but deferred to allow time for divided 
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Bougainvilleans to reconcile (Regan, 2002c). On the basis that those favouring 
integration would agree to back the holding of the referendum, the secessionists 
agreed to support the high autonomy for Bougainville preferred by the integrationists, 
a level of autonomy greatly in advance of the 1976 arrangements. 
This latter demand alone was a strong call, for by now PNG had effectively 
dismantled the 1976 devolution scheme, with provinces having much reduced (and 
uniform) autonomy (May, 1997; 1999). From 1995 elected provincial governments 
had been replaced by bodies made up of members of the national legislature from the 
provinces, together with heads of local-level government, all holding provincial office 
ex officio. In large part the reform was possible because the provincial government in 
Bougainville, the area of strongest support for devolution, was suspended, and 
Bougainville embroiled in civil war (Ghai and Regan, 2000). 
But the Bougainvilleans were in a strong negotiating position throughout the two 
years of talks that produced the Bougainville Peace Agreement of August 2001. The 
secessionists had held the upper hand militarily when the fighting ended in 1997, and 
retained arms and the capacity for disruption. Further, while the dissident Ona 
faction had limited support, its refusal to join the process limited the scope for 
compromise on the part of the Bougainville side to the negotiations, and added to the 
pressure on the PNG side. The nine years of conflict had involved a high cost for PNG 
in terms of impacts on the economy, damage to morale in the police and the army, 
and undermining the country's international human rights reputation. PNG was also 
under considerable international pressure to settle the conflict for purposes of regional 
stability. Moreover, it realized that the strong sense of grievance in Bougainville 
concerning the conflict required substantial concessions to be made if the conflict was 
to be resolved. It was also anxious to disarm the factions and remove weapons. 
Agreement was reached on enhanced autonomy only by PNG conceding that the 
issue of independence would be kept alive and revisited through a referendum for 
Bougainvilleans on Bougainville's independence deferred for a minimum of 10 years 
and a maximum of 15 years after establishing the autonomous government for 
Bougainville. Both referendum and autonomy would be constitutionally guaranteed, 
provided arms held by the Bougainville factions were disposed of. 
This time, the clear intention was that the new autonomy arrangements would 
apply only to Bougainville, which now therefore has a special status in the country: an 
asymmetry that may in turn spawn its own problems. But, for the time being, 
sufficient consensus was developed in the national cabinet and parliament for the 
extensive amendments to the national constitution to incorporate the 2001 Peace 
Agreement to be enacted early in 2002. In other ways too, considerable progress has 
been made towards its implementation. 
ASYMMETRICAL AUTONOMY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF INDEPENDENCE, 
2001 TO THE PRESENT 
As with the 1976 arrangements, large parts of the 2001 Peace Agreement have been 
implemented through amendments to the national constitution and an Organic Law 
on Peace-building in Bougainville - Autonomous Bougainville Government and 
Bougainville Referendum. These provisions cannot be amended by the PNG 
parliament without agreement by the Bougainville legislature. 
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As for the nature of the enhanced autonomy now available to Bougainville, we can 
highlight here just a few aspects that enable comparisons with features of the 1976 
arrangements summarized earlier. Only a small list of legislative powers in relation to 
Bougainville is reserved to the national government. Further, in the exercise of some 
of its powers (such as defence, foreign affairs and law and order), PNG is obliged to 
consult with Bougainville and to encourage its participation when Bougainville 
interests might be involved. In foreign affairs, for example, PNG may authorize 
Bougainville to enter into treaties with other states, and to have independent 
participation in international cultural or sporting activities. A long list of powers is 
made available to Bougainville, on an exclusive basis, which includes most subject 
areas likely to be covered by law, including power to establish a judiciary (subject to 
the ultimate appellate powers of the PNG Supreme Court), a public service and a 
police force. Bougainville has the right to initiate the process of transfer of powers 
from the national government by giving 12 months' notice, following which the two 
governments are required to cooperate to enable Bougainville to develop the capacity 
needed to exercise the power. 
The financial arrangements do not, however, guarantee as much to Bougainville as 
did the 1976 arrangements, reflecting both the fiscal crisis facing the PNG 
government since the mid-1990s and the absence of mine revenues in Bougainville 
(the Panguna mine not having operated since 1989). On the other hand, autonomy is 
far higher in terms of both choice of Bougainville government structures and 
intergovernmental relations. 
Concerning government structures, Bougainville now has its own constitution, 
drafted and adopted on behalf of its people by broadly representative bodies a 
Bougainville Constitutional Commission and a Bougainville Constituent Assembly -
and endorsed by PNG in December 2004. As authorized by the 2001 Peace 
Agreement and the PNG constitutional provisions implementing it, the Bougainville 
Constitution contains Bougainvilleans' choice of names for their government 
(Autonomous Bougainville Government - ABG) and for Bougainville (the Autono-
mous Region of Bougainville), both choices emphasizing a unique status, distinct 
from the provinces elsewhere in PNG. It also establishes an elected legislature, 
including three seats each reserved for women and former combatants. The ABG 
executive is headed by a directly elected president. Provision is made for a range of 
processes directed towards encouraging both accountability and close relations 
between the new government and the holders of customary authority in Bougainville 
society, and for a range of new institutions, most to be established in the future, when 
funding resources become available. 
As for intergovernmental relations, a joint supervisory body with equal 
representation of both governments is responsible for overseeing the implementation 
of the autonomy arrangements and for being the first formal stage of a dispute 
settlement process. In contrast to the subordination of provinces to the centre under 
the previous system, powers to suspend provincial governments or withdraw powers 
from them do not apply to Bougainville, a major move towards a coordinate status. 
It was possible to sell autonomy to Bougainville precisely because the 2001 
agreement kept alive the option of secession through the provision for a deferred 
referendum. The reluctant acceptance by the national government of the referendum 
provisions was facilitated by the manner in which provision on the subject was 
hedged in the agreement. The referendum can be held only after specified conditions 
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are met (weapons disposal achieved and good governance established and 
maintained). The Bougainville government can decide after all not to have a 
referendum, after consultation with the national government and by decision made in 
accordance with a process set out in the Bougainville Constitution (although the 
special majorities and consultative procedures laid down in that constitution make it 
unlikely that such a decision will ever be made). But, most importantly, the outcome 
of the referendum will at best be advisory, for to be effective it has to be ratified by the 
national parliament. It is evident that these rules and restrictions could themselves be 
a cause of friction in the future; but for the time being they have secured peace. 
The non-binding outcome of the referendum was contrary to the strong position of 
the Bougainvilleans for the first 18 months of the negotiations on political agreement. 
It was an issue on which they eventually compromised, under international pressure, 
in order to persuade the national government to agree to a constitutionally 
guaranteed referendum. They did so in the belief that, if they could unify 
Bougainvilleans and achieve a very high vote for independence, then, provided that 
the international community remained interested and involved, the PNG government 
would find it difficult to ignore the result. For its part the national government agreed 
not just because of international pressure, but also because it could argue that a non-
binding referendum did not undermine its sovereignty, and it would have 10 to IS 
years to demonstrate to Bougainvilleans that it would be in their interests to vote 
against independence. 
Although implementation of autonomy has occurred more slowly than expected, 
progress to date has been reasonable, but not without some strains on relations. 
Elections for the ABG were held in mid-200S. The capacity of the ABG's 
administrative arm is weak, making the process of taking over the many powers and 
functions available to the ABG very slow. In terms of funding, the inherent logic of 
the combination of autonomy and a deferred referendum on independence suggests 
that the national government will make available the significant levels of funding 
needed to persuade Bougainvilleans to vote in favour of staying within PNG when 
the referendum is held (much as France has been doing in relation to New 
Caledonia). So far, however, funding for the ABG from the national government in 
the first full year of autonomy has not been much more than the minimum. There 
are signs of the beginnings of frustration in the ABG, and increasing talk of 
allowing mining activity to resume as a way of ensuring that Bougainville has its 
own resources both to operate autonomy effectively and to provide the capacity 
needed for independence following the referendum. On the PNG side there are the 
beginnings of concern that the ABG is being too confrontational in some of its 
dealings with the national government, and unreasonably pushing the limits of some 
aspects of autonomy, notably its competence to participate in international meetings 
in the region. 
ASSESSMENT AND REFLECTIONS 
Asymmetry begets complexity, but it also has a wider political significance. With the 
2001 agreement Bougainville gains the prize that eluded it in 1976. Will it turn out to 
be a pyrrhic victory? Asymmetry seldom remains a bilateral matter between the 
asymmetrical unit and the centre. Others resent it for a variety of reasons. 
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Asymmetrical arrangements have become a common feature of federal and autonomy 
arrangements in ethnically based societies. They facilitate the devolution of powers 
according to the circumstances of different regions and communities, but they tend to 
set the pace for others. They can also lead to complex arrangements, especially as the 
central government has to manage diverse relationships with different parts of the 
country.6 There was relatively little opposition to a special status for Bougainville this 
time round, with widespread recognition that special arrangements were needed in 
the interests of reconciliation and peace building. 
Can this accommodation be sustained? If one goes by the experience of some other 
countries, one would have to accept that Bougainville asymmetry will most probably 
create tensions. Sometimes these tensions are managed by extending 'asymmetrical' 
relations to others - asymmetry is eliminated by enhanced autonomy for all (as 
happened in PNG in 1976). Pressure is already being applied by the East New Britain 
provincial government, which has a reasonable administrative record, seeking 
increased autonomy by drawing on the 2001 agreement (though taking care, so 
far, to indicate acceptance that peace building requires special arrangements for 
Bougainville). Would increasing pressures of this kind further loosen the structures of 
the state, making it harder for the centre, both at political and administrative levels, 
to manage centre - provincial relations? 
What has devolution represented for PNG, and what will the enhanced autonomy 
do for Bougainville? Earlier we noted two impulses behind the original devolution 
proposals: accommodation of ethnic identity and participation intended to increase 
efficiency and responsiveness. Ethnicity has played a limited role elsewhere in PNG 
since independence (see, however, Larmour, 1990, 1992). This is perhaps because 
the very existence of numerous communities and identities dilutes the force of 
ethnicity; the ethnic base is often too slender to mobilize. It also means that the 
province is too large a unit for anyone group to capture and dominate to make it 
the basis of ethnic identity. Perhaps cultural differences were not so substantial as to 
matter, at least politically. When we examine the purposes to which provinces put 
their powers under the 1976 arrangements, culture does not figure highly. In fact 
most provinces were not effective in mobilizing political support for provincial 
institutions, making it easy for the central government to repeal the 1976 
arrangements in 1995. 
Perhaps the lesson is that, while internal administrative boundaries can stimulate 
territorial identity, prior strong political or cultural consciousness is necessary for 
effective devolution. The role of provincial government could have been to foster 
provincial consciousness as part of nation building and, in the early days, particularly 
as people engaged in provincial constitution making, provincial identity seemed to be 
emerging (Ghai and Regan, 1992). But it seems not to have been sustained largely 
because the interests of some leading provincial personalities turned to national 
politics and most provincial governments were singularly inept at delivering material 
goods or political participation. 
Is Bougainville, much given to the rhetoric of cultural identity, and where the 
conflict and the peace process have heightened a sense of distinct experience and 
identity, exceptional? Its 'islandness' and physical separation from the rest of the 
country, the distinctive appearance of its people and their proximity to Solomon 
Islands all emphasized Bougainvilleans' sense of uniqueness. But the conflicts with the 
rest of the country were not fundamentally ethnic. In 1976 they had more to do with 
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the allocation of resources, particularly mining revenue. In 1989 mining revenue was 
still a major factor in an extraordinarily complex situation which worsened into 
armed conflict in part because of internal Bougainville differences, as well as of 
dissent from central government policies (some of the strongest champions of 
devolution, in the form of provincial government, were Bougainvilleans). But the 
dynamics of the conflict enhanced a distinction between 'us' (Bougainvilleans) and 
'them' (other Papua New Guineans). Autonomy is now seen as providing an 
opportunity for Bougainvilleans to further develop their own identity (Bougainville 
Peace Agreement, 2001, para. 4). It is yet to be seen if the experience will be 
significantly different from that under the 1976 Agreement. While the terms of both 
the 2001 Peace Agreement and the new Bougainville Constitution suggest that the 
Bougainvilleans are much more ambitious the second time round, it is ironic that, 
without mine revenues, the resources available to develop autonomy will be much 
less. 
What light does this PNG history throw on the claim that devolution/federalism is 
the first step to secession (often the strongest argument against autonomy)? At first 
glance, Bougainville's experiences seem to substantiate the claim. It could be argued 
that, having obtained limited autonomy in 1976 (by the 'threat' of the loss of mining 
revenue), it used that autonomy to raise the stakes, and then in 1989 by force of arms 
demanded secession, settling temporarily for enhanced autonomy only by winning the 
option of independence. We believe that this is a misreading. After the 1976 
autonomy Bougainville leaders established an effective government in accordance 
with national laws, and played a full role in national politics. The 1989 troubles in 
large part had a common source to those of the mid-1970s - the inequitable 
distribution of the income from the copper mine - but this time it was initially not a 
province-wide protest. Rather, it originated in internal disputes among mine-lease 
landowner communities over distribution of mine revenues. It was the violent 
responses of the PNG forces that wrongly assumed a broad-based rebellion, which 
enabled a broader Bougainvillean mobilization round ethnic identity. But that 
rebellion was opposed by some other Bougainvilleans, even in its early stages (Togolo, 
2005), and deeper divisions emerged when the secessionist rebels were unable to 
control the situation after the PNG forces withdrew from Bougainville in March 
1990. 
The local democratic forces to which autonomy had given rise were as much the 
victims of the anger and violence of the rebels as of the central authorities. The 1976 
devolution arrangements had strengthened Bougainville's links to the rest of the 
country, for they eliminated some genuine grievances and established a democratic 
order internally connected to the national system. There is little doubt that, without 
the 1976 autonomy, the rebellion of 1989 would have garnered more support in 
Bougainville. Hence autonomy limited support for secession rather than promoted it. 
In presenting its case for greater autonomy in the 1999 - 2001 negotiations, the 
potential of autonomy to strengthen national unity by producing a better balance 
between national and provincial interests was highlighted by some Bougainvillean 
negotiators. 
The key to the settlement was the promise not so much of independence but the 
willingness of PNG to consider it - in effect, the postponement of this critical issue. 
The 2001 agreement represents a departure (albeit reluctant on the part of the 
national government) from obsession with state sovereignty. It not only diffused the 
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sovereignty issue by hinting at the coordinate status of Bougainville with PNG, but 
also fudged that issue by postponing resolution of the ambiguity. Diffusing, 
fragmenting and fudging sovereignty will probably also be critical to the settlement 
of many internal disputes as the 2001 agreement is implemented. Sovereignty also 
becomes contingent, depending on circumstances beyond the control of the central 
state; in some situations it has to be earned. We have examples of this same 
phenomenon from New Caledonia,7 where a peace agreement makes provision for a 
combination of autonomy and a deferred referendum on independence. Serious 
negotiations over Bougainville started only when it was agreed (even though, initially, 
only hypothetically on the part of the national government) that independence could 
in some sense be part of the agenda. 
There are, however, risks for PNG in arrangements that keep open the possibility 
of independence for Bougainville. On the one hand, they create pressure on PNG to 
allocate high levels of resources to Bougainville (to encourage a majority pre-
integration vote in the referendum vote). On the other hand, PNG faces severe fiscal 
problems that make it difficult to treat Bougainville as a special case. Some national 
government elements expect that a strong pro-independence vote is likely anyway, 
and so oppose allocating additional funding that they see as likely to build 
Bougainville capacity for independence. If Bougainvilleans' high expectations of 
autonomy are not met, frustration can be expected to grow. 
There is no doubt that the high level of autonomy now available to Bougainville 
would enable it to explore the innovative development strategies that many other 
island autonomies have been deploying (Baldacchino, 2004). Even para-diplomacy 
is now much more readily open, with the ABG having some foreign affairs-related 
powers available. But the main examples of island autonomies that have made 
effective use of such strategies are autonomies arising from a colonial relationship, 
in which the capacities have developed gradually in a situation where the colonial 
authority (present or former) has interests in building capacity of and providing 
resources to the autonomous unit. These experiences may have little relevance to 
Bougainville, where capacity is low and will be difficult to build, and there are 
indications of limited interest at the national level in providing high levels of 
resources. If Bougainvillean expectations about autonomy are not met, then 
frustration about the operation of autonomy may contribute to growing nationalism 
and a tendency to assume that a referendum vote for independence is the only 
option. If so, it may be not so much autonomy that leads to increased pressure for 
secession but difficulties in managing the agreed arrangements for a combination of 
autonomy with a deferred referendum on independence. 
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Notes 
1. For discussion of the process, see Griffin et al. (1979, pp. 217 -229); Wolfers (1982); Ghai 
(1985; 1988a; 1997); Somare (2001); Momis (2001); Narokobi (2001); and Regan et al. 
(2001, pp. 345 - 365). 
2. In Papua New Guinea the term decentralization rather than devolution was used. In this 
chapter we use the term devolution, as it more accurately describes the system that was 
favoured by the constitutional commission and as it is generally understood. 
3. For detailed analysis of the origins and operation of the 1976 devolution arrangements, see 
Conyers (1976); Barnett (1979); Ballard (1981); Regan (1985a; 1985b); Axline (1986); Ghai 
and Regan (1992; 2001); May and Regan (1997); and May (1999). 
4. For discussion of the origins and course of the conflict, see Filer (1990); May and Spriggs 
(1990); Ogan (1992); Spriggs and Denoon (1992); Wesley-Smith (1992); Regan (1998a, 
2001a, 2003, 2005a); Denoon (2000); Ghai and Regan (2000); Kauona (2001); Regan and 
Griffin (2005); May (2005). 
5. For discussion of the complex origins and unfolding of the peace process, see Regan (1997); 
Dinnen et al. (1997); Dorney (1998); O'Callaghan (1999); Wehner and Denoon (2001); 
Rolfe (2001); Adams (2001); Regan (2001a, 2001b, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2003); Carl and 
Garasu (2002); Boege and Garasu (2004); and May (2005). 
6. Agranoff (1994); Boase (1994); Browne-John (1994); Ghai (2002b, pp. 157-162); Milne 
(1994); and Stevens (1997). 
7. See Chappell (1999); Maclellan (1999, 2005); Garde (2001); Angleviel (2003); Faberon 
(2003); Faberon and Postic (2004); Christnacht (2004); and Rumley (2006). 
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